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YOU BLEW IT: THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE & 
BREATHALYZERS AS TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT 
 
People v. Umpierre1 
(decided September 21, 2012) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the United States Supreme Court decisions in 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts2 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico,3 
with respect to scientific testing, courts have maintained varying 
views of what constitutes testimonial evidence,4 especially in New 
York.5  The first issue presented to the court in Umpierre was wheth-
 
1 951 N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012). 
2 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
3 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
4 Compare Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 947 N.E.2d 1060, 1062 (Mass. 2011), and State 
v. Benson, 287 P.3d 927, 928 (Kan. 2012) (holding that the Breathalyzer certifications were 
non-testimonial and were admissible absent live in-court testimony), with Derr v. State, 29 
A.3d 533, 554 (Md. 2008), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 63 (relying on Bullcoming, holding that 
calibration reports are testimonial in nature because they “present[] a risk of error that might 
be explored on cross-examination”), and Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005) (holding that Breathalyzer calibration reports are testimonial, even under Craw-
ford standards, because an objective witness could reasonably expect that they would be 
used at a criminal prosecution). 
5 Compare People v. Hulbert, 939 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012), People 
v. Harvey, 907 N.Y.S.2d 102, 102 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding that the calibration reports and 
the simulator solution reports, ensuring the reliability of the Breathalyzer instrument, are not 
testimonial because they do not link the defendant to the crime), and People v. Lebrecht, 823 
N.Y.S.2d 824, 828 (App. Term 2006) (holding that the breath test certification reports were 
non-testimonial because they were neutral in character, relating only to the operation of the 
instrument and the simulator solution used to calibrate it, and the reports did not result from 
“structured police questioning,” were not created as an official request to gain incriminating 
evidence, and did not accuse anyone of criminal conduct), with People v. Heyanka, 886 
N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Dist. Ct. 2009) (holding that the calibration reports were testimonial be-
cause they were prepared with a “reasonable expectation that they would be used at criminal 
1
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er Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 results qualified as testimonial 
evidence, requiring live in-court testimony.6  After determining that 
the Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 results were testimonial, the 
court then had to determine who could testify in order to withstand a 
Confrontation Clause challenge.7  Relying on federal precedent, the 
court in Umpierre correctly held that the admission of the test results, 
without live in-court testimony from the officer who performed the 
Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000, violated Umpierre’s rights under 
the Confrontation Clause.8 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 14, 2010, Jose Umpierre was erratically chang-
ing lanes when two New York Police Department (“NYPD”) Offic-
ers, Stephen Rizzo and Daniel Glatz, pulled him over.9  Officer Rizzo 
observed that Umpierre appeared intoxicated, and consequently gave 
Umpierre a Breathalyzer.10  While Officer Rizzo administered the 
Breathalyzer, Officer Glatz stood several feet away and did not hear 
any words exchanged.11  Upon failing the Breathalyzer, Officer Rizzo 
arrested Umpierre and charged him with various alcohol-related traf-
fic offenses.12  After bringing Umpierre to the 45th precinct, Officer 
Rizzo administered a follow-up Intoxilyzer 5000, which the defend-
ant also failed.13 
In anticipation of trial, the prosecution sought to introduce 
 
prosecutions.”), and People v. Carriera, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (Crim. Ct. 2010) (holding 
that the breath test calibration and simulator solution tests were testimonial because they 
were created by law enforcement officials for use at trial). 
6 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 384. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 386. 
9 Id. at 383. 
10 Id. 
11 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 384 (noting that Officer Glatz operated a video camera dur-
ing the testing but could not hear the words exchanged—why the prosecution did not admit 
the video into evidence is beyond the scope of this case note). 
12 Id. at 383.  See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(1) (McKinney 2012) (driving while 
impaired statute); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 2012) (driving while abil-
ity impaired statute); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2)(a) (providing the aggravated driv-
ing while intoxicated statute);  VEH. & TRAF. Law § 1192(3) (driving while intoxicated stat-
ute); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1)(b) (McKinney 2010) (administering field sobriety 
tests to establish the suspect’s blood-alcohol level at the scene standard). 
13 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 383; N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2)(a). 
2
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both the Breathalyzer and the Intoxilyzer 5000 test results.14  
Umpierre moved to exclude this evidence, arguing that because Of-
ficer Rizzo was unavailable he would not be able to cross-examine 
him about the test results; thus, his right to confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment would be violated.15  Relying on the precedent set 
forth in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the court determined that the 
test results were testimonial and could only be introduced through 
live in-court testimony of the officer who conducted the tests—
Officer Rizzo.16  The court explained that because Officer Glatz was 
merely a test observer and he was not within hearing distance while 
the tests were conducted, he could not testify on behalf of Officer 
Rizzo.17  Thus, the court granted the defendant’s motion.18 
III. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause has continuously evolved.19  The Sixth 
Amendment guarantees “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”20  Although the language of the Sixth Amendment appears 
straight-forward, “the exact contours of th[is] right in the context of 
scientific testing is a source of significant litigation.”21  The Court 
built upon its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. 
 
14 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 383. 
15 Id. at 384. 
16 Id. at 386. 
17 Id. at 384. 
18 Id. at 386. 
19 Megan Weisgerber, Confronting Forensics: Bullcoming v. New Mexico and the Sixth 
Amendment, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 613, 614 (2012); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 
(1970); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by, Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305; 
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S Ct. 1143 (2011); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705; Williams v. Illi-
nois, 132 U.S. 2221, 2227 (2012). 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (making the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause applicable to state criminal prosecutions through 
incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
21 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 385; Michael J. Hutter, ‘Pealer’ and Forensic-Related Rec-
ords: Confronting ‘Crawford’ and its progeny, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 4, 2013) (stating that because 
of the categories created in Crawford, “[m]uch litigation has ensued over the boundaries of 
these categories, especially as to the classification of forensic reports . . . and the records of 
the maintenance/calibration/inspection efforts employed to ensure that the devices or ma-
chines utilized in those analyses and tests are working properly.”). 
3
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Washington22 when it overruled Ohio v. Roberts23 and shifted its in-
quiry from whether the evidence is reliable to whether the evidence is 
“testimonial.”24  In recent years, the Court has clarified what consti-
tutes testimonial evidence and what is required to pass constitutional 
muster.25 
In Crawford the Supreme Court established a new test to de-
termine whether the evidence is testimonial in nature.26  In Crawford, 
the defendant was charged with assault and attempted murder after he 
stabbed the victim.27  Although the defendant claimed that he had 
stabbed the victim in self-defense, his wife gave a tape-recorded 
statement to the police undermining his self-defense claim.28  At trial, 
the prosecution sought to play the recording because, under the state 
marital privilege statute, the prosecution was unable to call the de-
fendant’s wife as a witness.29  The defendant moved to suppress the 
recording, claiming that it violated his Sixth Amendment right be-
cause he could not cross-examine his wife.30  The trial court, relying 
 
22 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
23 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  The Court held that out-of-court statements by witnesses who are 
unable to testify can be admitted into evidence if the court determines that the evidence falls 
within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or has “particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness”.  Id. at 66.  See Harlan Spector, Legal Challenges Mount Against Controversial 
Breath-Alcohol Tester, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 13, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.cleveland.co 
m/metro/index.ssf/2013/01/legal_challenges_mount_against.htm l?utm_medium=referral&ut 
m_source=t.co (stating that the sole purpose for the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the 
reliability of the statement). 
24 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 n.6 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (determining that a 
statement is testimonial when it has a “primary purpose of establishing or proving past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
25 See Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that the Supreme Court 
was sharply divided when it extended the ruling in Crawford to Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming). 
26 541 U.S. at 51-52; see also United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 
2011) (noting that the Court in Crawford affected a shift in Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence). 
27 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38, 40. 
28 Id. at 40 (noting that the defendant had stabbed the victim because the victim had alleg-
edly tried to rape the defendant’s wife). 
29 Id.  The defendant’s wife was unavailable and was not subject to cross examination at 
trial because of the Washington State marital privilege statute, which generally bars a spouse 
from testifying against the other spouse without the defendant-spouse’s consent.  Id.  Under 
this statute, the privilege does not protect out-of-court statements made by the spouse, which 
are admissible as a hearsay exception.  Id.  See also WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 5.60.060(1) 
(LexisNexis 1994). 
30 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 4, Art. 17
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/17
2014] YOU BLEW IT 1179 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Roberts, allowed the prosecution 
to play the recording for the jury, which ultimately resulted in a 
guilty verdict for the defendant.31  On appeal, the Washington Court 
of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction.32  However, the 
Washington Supreme Court reinstated the defendant’s conviction, 
unanimously holding that the recording bore “guarantees of trustwor-
thiness” because it was virtually identical to the defendant’s confes-
sion.33 
On review, the United States Supreme Court in Crawford 
overruled Roberts, holding that the decision was inconsistent with the 
Framers’ intentions.34  The decision in Crawford repudiated the 
Court’s prior Confrontation Clause jurisprudence by shifting the in-
quiry from whether the evidence had “indicia of reliability” to wheth-
er the evidence was testimonial.35  If a statement is deemed testimo-
nial, its introduction into evidence will violate the Sixth Amendment 
unless the prosecution produces the declarant as a witness or shows 
that the declarant is unavailable and that the defendant had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.36  The Court established three cat-
egories of out-of-court statements that qualify as testimonial: 
[(1)] ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custo-
dial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant 
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial state-
ments that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially; [(2)] extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
 
31 Id. at 40-41. 
32 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.  The court used a nine-factor test and determined the record-
ing was not reliable because the witness stated that her eyes were shut during the stabbing, 
she contradicted a prior statement, and her answers were in response to specific questions 
asked by the police.  Id. 
33 Id.  The Confrontation Clause is implicated anytime a witness offers testimony against 
the defendant.  Id. at 51. 
34 Id. at 62-63, 65-66 (stating that the reliability test strays from the original meaning of 
the Confrontation Clause and emphasizing that the right to confront one’s accusers dates 
back to Roman times). 
35 Id. at 51 (defining testimony as a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the pur-
pose of establishing or proving some fact” and that assessing the reliability of testimony is 
amorphous and subjective). 
36 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54 (emphasizing that the Framers would not have condoned 
ex parte examinations involving law enforcement because of the focused language of the 
Confrontation Clause). 
5
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affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; 
and [(3)] statements that were made under circum-
stances which would lead an objective witness to rea-
sonably believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.37 
Under the first category, the Court held that because the prosecution 
introduced the recording into evidence and gave no opportunity for 
cross-examination, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right had been 
violated.38  Despite establishing the three categories, the Court de-
clined to clearly explain under what circumstances the admission of 
each type of evidence implicates the right to confrontation, leaving 
the issue “for another day.”39 
That day arose when the Supreme Court decided Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts.40  In Melendez-Diaz, Boston Police Officers 
received a tip from an informant that an employee of a local store 
was involved in suspicious activity.41  The police set up surveillance 
outside of the store and witnessed the employee get into a car with 
two men—activity resembling a drug deal.42  After the employee ex-
ited the vehicle, one of the officers detained and searched him, find-
ing a plastic bag containing what appeared to be cocaine.43  The of-
ficers arrested all three men, including the defendant and placed them 
in the back of their police vehicle.44  At the police station, the officers 
found nineteen small plastic bags in the police vehicle where the de-
fendant had been sitting.45  The police sent the bags to the lab for test-
ing, which revealed that they all contained cocaine.46 
At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce the criminal fo-
rensic laboratory certificates into evidence, which certified that the 
 
37 Id. at 51-52. 
38 Id. at 68. 
39 Id.; see Nardi, 662 F.3d at 111 (noting that although the majority opinion in Crawford 
commanded seven Justices and the remaining two Justices concurred with that result, the 
decision was misleading because the Court declined to determine how far the testimonial 
statement reached, suggesting a narrow interpretation of what constitutes testimonial evi-
dence). 
40 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 308. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308. 
46 Id. 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 4, Art. 17
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/17
2014] YOU BLEW IT 1181 
drug in the defendant’s possession was cocaine.47  The defendant ob-
jected to the admission of these affidavits, arguing that his inability to 
cross-examine the analyst who conducted the tests violated the Con-
frontation Clause.48  The trial court overruled the defendant’s objec-
tion; the defendant was convicted and subsequently appealed.49  The 
Appeals Court of Massachusetts rejected the defendant’s claim, rely-
ing on state precedent that “authors of certificates of forensic analysis 
are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”50 
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four 
decision, expanded the scope of testimonial evidence to include a 
consideration of whether the evidence was obtained strictly for use at 
trial.51  The Court, relying on its decision in Palmer v. Hoffman,52 
stated that documents containing hearsay, which can ordinarily be 
admitted under the business record exception, cannot be admitted if 
the regularly conducted business activity is “the production of evi-
dence for use at trial.”53  Affidavits, like the ones at issue, had already 
been analyzed in Davis v. Washington,54 and the Court noted that “ 
‘certificates’ [that] are functionally identical to live, in-court testimo-
ny, do[] ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’ ”55  
The Court concluded that, absent the testimony of the person who 
performed the underlying tests, the criminal forensic laboratory re-
ports were testimonial, and thus, inadmissible.56  The Court reasoned 
that the reports were not exempt from Confrontation Clause scrutiny 
because they were “quite plainly affidavits” falling within the “core 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 309. 
49 Id. (holding that the certificates were admitted pursuant to Massachusetts law as “prima 
facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the narcotic . . . analyzed”) 
(quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13 (repealed 2012) (alteration in original)). 
50 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309; Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705-06 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that the drug certificates at issue were admissible as business 
records and did not constitute testimonial evidence because they have very little connection 
to the type of evidence the Confrontation Clause was designed to exclude). 
51 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309, 321. 
52 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943). 
53 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321; FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
54 Davis, 547 U.S. at 836-37. 
55 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 83, that the affidavits 
are testimonial under Crawford because an objective witness could reasonably believe that 
they would be used for trial and that the sole purpose was to make a prima facie prosecu-
tion). 
56 Id. at 324. 
7
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class of testimonial statements” set forth in Crawford.57  The Court 
emphasized that confrontation ensures accurate forensic analysis and 
is “designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the in-
competent one as well.”58  The Court observed that an analyst’s lack 
of proper training or deficiency in a judgment may be discovered dur-
ing cross-examination.59 
Subsequently, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,60 a five-Justice 
majority reaffirmed Melendez-Diaz and clarified that a substitute ana-
lyst could not testify on behalf of the person who performed the certi-
fications in order to withstand Confrontation Clause scrutiny.61  In 
Bullcoming, the defendant rear-ended a pick-up truck, and as the 
driver of the pick-up truck approached the defendant to exchange in-
formation, he smelled alcohol and noticed that the defendant’s eyes 
were bloodshot.62  The defendant fled the scene and was later appre-
hended by police, who administered field sobriety tests.63  Upon fail-
ing the tests, the police arrested the defendant.64  Because the defend-
ant refused to take another sobriety test, the police obtained a warrant 
authorizing such a test at a nearby hospital.65  After the sample was 
taken, the police sent it to the New Mexico Department of Health, 
Scientific Laboratory Division (“SLD”).66  The SLD’s report con-
tained information supplied by the arresting officer, including that he 
witnessed the blood being drawn.67  The report also contained certifi-
cations by the nurse who drew the sample and the SLD analyst’s cer-
 
57 Id. at 310 (relying on Crawford to find that the defendant was entitled to confront the 
analysts at trial). 
58 Id. at 312, 319 (emphasizing that the majority was not, as the dissent warned, “sweep-
ing away an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence,” and that all of the 
cases it cited relied on the “since-rejected theory that unconfronted testimony was admissible 
as long as it bore indicia of reliability.”). 
59 Id. at 317-20 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62, that “[the Confrontation Clause] com-
mands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: 
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.  Dispensing with confrontation because tes-
timony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obvi-
ously guilty.  This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”). 
60 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
61 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713; compare Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 306, (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting), with Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
62 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
8
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tifications, stating that the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was well 
above the legal limit.68 
At trial, the prosecutor announced that another SLD analyst 
would be called as a witness because the SLD analyst who performed 
the certification had gone on unpaid leave.69  The defendant objected 
to this analyst’s testimony, arguing that it violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.70  The trial court overruled the defendant’s ob-
jection and admitted the SLD report into evidence as a business rec-
ord.71  The jury convicted the defendant of aggravated driving while 
intoxicated (“DWI”).72  On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals upheld the defendant’s conviction and concluded that the report 
was non-testimonial and was “prepared routinely with guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”73  While the defendant’s appeal to the New Mexico 
Supreme Court was pending, the United States Supreme Court decid-
ed Melendez-Diaz.74  In light of the Court’s decision in Melendez-
Diaz, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the admission of the 
report did not violate the Confrontation Clause despite acknowledg-
ing that the report was testimonial.75 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bullcoming to ad-
dress whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to in-
troduce a forensic laboratory report through live in-court testimony of 
an analyst who did not perform the underlying test.76  The Court rea-
soned that because the SLD analyst’s testimony not only indicated 
the results of the analysis, but also the procedures involved, a substi-
tute analyst would not be able to testify to any potential errors during 
that process.77  This type of evidence, the Court stated, was testimo-
nial if it was “made in aid of a police investigation” or if it was used 
in order to establish a fact at trial.78  The Court held that the prosecu-
tor could not introduce the written analysis of individuals who neither 
 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 2711-12. 
70 Id. at 2712. 
71 Id. 
72 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 2712-13 (emphasizing that the substitute analyst was a qualified expert with re-
spect to the machine). 
76 Id. 
77 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2711. 
78 Id. at 2717. 
9
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participated in nor observed the testing of the blood sample.79  The 
Court emphasized that the accused have a right to confront the ana-
lyst who made the report and that an additional scientific report could 
not be introduced unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the analyst who prepared it.80 
IV. THE NEW YORK INTERPRETATION OF TESTIMONIAL 
EVIDENCE 
Prior to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the New York Court 
of Appeals had decided People v. Rawlins81 and People v. Meekins.82  
The Court of Appeals decided both Rawlins and Meekins on the same 
day and relied upon the precedent set by Crawford to assess whether 
DNA and latent fingerprint comparison reports were testimonial in 
nature, and thus, whether their admission, absent the experts’ testi-
mony, violated each respective defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
rights.83  The Court of Appeals explored the first category of “ex 
parte in-court testimony,” established by the Court in Crawford, to 
justify its holding.84 
The Court of Appeals held that latent fingerprint comparison 
reports, prepared by law enforcement in Rawlins, were “nothing but 
testimonial” because they were prepared by police for the use at trial; 
however, because of the overwhelming evidence, the admission of 
the reports was deemed harmless error.85  In the companion case, 
Meekins, the court deemed a rape-kit DNA analysis, prepared by an 
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) employee, non-
testimonial because it was the product of a neutral scientific analy-
sis.86  Thus, the court held that the reports were admissible and did 
not offend the Confrontation Clause because they were not the type 
of “ex parte testimony that the Confrontation Clause was designed to 
 
79 Id. at 2710. 
80 Id. (holding that a “surrogate analyst,” or any person who works for the laboratory, is 
not a sufficient witness and will not escape the Confrontation Clause violation). 
81 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008) (noting that, at that time, this was an issue of first impres-
sion for the New York Court of Appeals). 
82 884 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that a rape-kit DNA report, prepared by the 
OCME, was non-testimonial because it was the product of a scientific analysis and did not 
indicate the defendant’s innocence or guilt). 
83 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1022. 
84 Id. at 1026. 
85 Id. at 1033-34. 
86 Id. at 1035. 
10
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protect against.”87  The court determined that the DNA reports fell 
outside of the scope of the first category because the reports were nei-
ther made “with an eye toward trial,” nor prepared as “formal state-
ment[s] to government officers.”88 
However, in 2009, after the Supreme Court, in Melendez-
Diaz, clarified that Crawford’s categories of testimonial evidence ex-
tended to scientific testing, the New York Court of Appeals decided 
People v. Brown89 and disregarded the Court’s decision by following 
and expanding upon its own decision in Rawlins and Meekins.90  And 
yet, even after the Supreme Court expanded its Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence in Bullcoming, the New York Court of Appeals in Peo-
ple v. Pealer91 analyzed the issue by relying on Rawlins, Meekins, 
and Brown instead of the federal precedent.92  Because of the con-
flicting interpretations of Confrontation Clause precedent by the 
Court of Appeals, many lower New York courts continue to struggle 
when determining what type of evidence triggers the Confrontation 
Clause.93 
In Brown, the defendant raped a nine-year old girl and hit her 
with a brick after she resisted his sexual advances.94  Upon awaking, 
the victim ran to her friend who brought her to the hospital where a 
rape kit was performed.95  Due to a substantial backlog and lack of 
funding, the OCME sent the rape kit—almost nine years after the 
crime—to one of its subcontracting laboratories for testing.96  While 
 
87 Id. (noting that although the Court in Crawford declined to give a “precise definition” 
of testimonial, the Court categorically gave “additional clues,” which are generally described 
on the whole as “ex parte accusatory” testimony). 
88 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1026 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, that the involvement 
of government law enforcement officials in gathering ex parte accusatory testimony or 
statements presents a “unique potential for prosecutorial abuse”). 
89 918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009). 
90 See Hutter, supra note 27 (stating that the New York Court of Appeals provided the 
framework, which the Supreme Court lacked, which is necessary in determining whether 
evidence is testimonial). 
91 985 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 2013). 
92 Id. at 903. 
93 See, e.g., People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that an autopsy re-
port could be admitted as a business record, not requiring live in-court testimony because an 
autopsy report is non-testimonial); People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
2011) (holding that an un-redacted autopsy report could be admitted into evidence without 
testimony from the person who prepared it because it was not testimonial). 
94 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 928. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 928-29. 
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examining the perpetrator’s semen from the rape kit, the laboratory 
technician isolated a male DNA specimen from a string of thirteen 
areas.97  The technician entered this information into the Combined 
DNA Index System, and three years later, “a routine search of the da-
tabase registered a ‘cold hit,’ linking [the] defendant’s DNA to the 
profile found in the victim’s rape kit.”98  Subsequently, the Queens 
Special Victims Squad took a DNA sample from the defendant and 
delivered it to the OCME, who then compared the defendant’s DNA 
to the DNA from the rape kit.99  The OCME analyst determined that 
the two profiles matched, occurring in “one out of one trillion 
males.”100 
At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce the DNA report, 
including a profile of the specimen taken from the rape kit as a busi-
ness record.101  Despite the defendant’s objections, the trial court held 
that the DNA evidence was admissible because it was non-
testimonial.102  The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of 
sodomy, two counts of assault, and endangering the welfare of a 
child; the Appellate Division Second Department affirmed the con-
viction.103  On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the court 
differentiated DNA results from other laboratory results by stating 
that “DNA test results, standing alone, shed no light on the guilt of 
the accused in the absence of an expert’s opinion that the results ge-
netically match a known sample.”104  The Court distinguished Melen-
dez-Diaz from Brown, observing that in Brown, the OCME analyst 
testified and came to her own conclusions based on the report provid-
ed by the subcontracting laboratory, whereas in Melendez-Diaz, the 
affidavits concluded that the defendant possessed cocaine.105  The 
court relied on the primary purpose test, enunciated in People v. 
Freycinet,106 to clarify whether the report about which the OCME an-
 
97 Id. at 929 (noting that the lab technician also created a report which contained “ma-
chine-generated raw data, graphs and charts of the male specimen’s DNA characteristics.”). 
98 Id. 
99 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 929. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 929-30. 
103 Id. at 930. 
104 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 930-31. 
105 Compare id. at 931 (noting that the OCME analyst took the stand), with Melendez-
Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308-09 (noting that the prosecution sought to introduce the certificates 
without in-court testimony). 
106 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008). 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 4, Art. 17
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/17
2014] YOU BLEW IT 1187 
alyst testified was the functional equivalent of live in-court testimo-
ny, and thus, testimonial under Crawford.  The standard created by 
the court asked: 
(1) whether the agency that produced the record is in-
dependent of law enforcement; (2) whether it reflects 
objective facts at the time of their recording; (3) 
whether the report has been biased in favor of law en-
forcement; and (4) whether the report accuses the de-
fendant by directly linking him or her to the crime.107 
After considering all four categories, the court held that the reports 
were non-testimonial.108  The court determined that the subcontract-
ing laboratory was private and independent of law enforcement and 
that there was no subjective analysis because the report did not con-
tain any conclusions regarding the suspect’s identity.109  The court 
emphasized that the technician prepared the report prior to the de-
fendant becoming a suspect and that the testimony of the OCME ana-
lyst, not the report, linked the defendant to the crime.110  Thus, the 
court reasoned that, unlike the defendant in Melendez-Diaz, the de-
fendant in Brown had the ability to cross-examine the witness who 
linked him to the crime.111 
In People v. Thompson,112 law enforcement officials took 
blood samples from two burglary crime scenes.113  The samples were 
sent to two private laboratories and technicians created reports con-
taining DNA profiles developed from the samples.114  At trial, the 
prosecution sought to introduce the reports without providing testi-
mony from the technician who prepared them.115  The defendant ob-
jected, arguing that this would violate his Sixth Amendment right.116  
The court held that the reports were not testimonial, and the jury ul-
timately found the defendant guilty.117  The defendant appealed, and 
 
107 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931. 
108 Id. at 932; see also Pealer, 985 N.E.2d at 904. 
109 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931. 
110 Id. at 932. 
111 Id. at 931. 
112 895 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010). 
113 Id. at 148-49. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 149. 
116 Id. 
117 Thompson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 148. 
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the Second Department affirmed, relying on Brown, stating that be-
cause the reports were “merely machine-generated graphs,” they 
would not require further explanation.118  The Second Department 
observed that the analysts would only be able to testify as to how 
they performed certain tests because their analysis did not link the de-
fendant to any crime nor did it contain any subjective conclusions or 
comparisons of the samples taken from the defendant and from the 
crime scene.119 
Subsequently, in People v. Encarnacion,120 upon responding 
to a 911 call at a Bronx apartment building, the defendant told the po-
lice that while he was out getting food “some black guy” stabbed his 
girlfriend and her cousin.121  The police subsequently entered the 
apartment and found the defendant’s girlfriend, with multiple stab 
wounds, alongside her cousin who was dead.122  At the scene, police 
found a garbage bag full of different items including clothing and 
bloody knives.123  After the defendant’s girlfriend was transported to 
the hospital, she told doctors that the defendant had stabbed her.124  
The police interviewed the defendant, and after telling him that his 
girlfriend was alive and had identified him as her attacker, he con-
fessed.125 
At trial, the prosecution called the forensic analyst from the 
OCME, who performed the DNA testing on all of the clothing except 
for a pair of jeans, sneakers, and socks.126  The analyst testified about 
the tests that she performed—but also about the tests that she did not 
perform—which linked the defendant to the crime.127  The defendant 
objected, arguing that the analyst’s testimony, linking his DNA to the 
DNA found on all of the clothes, violated his right to confronta-
tion.128  The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument, and the ju-
ry subsequently convicted him on all counts.129 
 
118 Id. at 149. 
119 Id. 
120 926 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Div 1st Dep’t 2011). 
121 Id. at 450. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 450-51. 
126 Id. at 456. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 451 (noting that the defendant was convicted of second degree murder, attempted 
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On appeal, the First Department upheld the defendant’s con-
viction, stating that a DNA analyst can testify regarding the analysis 
of a test she did not perform because those tests revealed non-
accusatory raw data.130  The court relied on the decision in Brown and 
deemed the analyst’s testimony, and all corresponding notes and re-
ports, to be non-testimonial.131  Ironically, the same day that the First 
Department decided Encarnacion, the Supreme Court decided 
Bullcoming, which took the opposite view.132 
Despite the trend in New York, the Second Department came 
to a different conclusion in People v. Oliver133 and followed the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of testimonial evidence in Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming.134  In Oliver, the police found blood at the sce-
ne of a burglary and sent it to the Suffolk County Crime Laboratory 
for testing.135  The forensic scientist tested the DNA and uploaded it 
onto the database; two weeks later, he discovered that a crime labora-
tory in Albany matched the DNA profile to the defendant’s.136  At tri-
al, evidence of the DNA match was admitted, and the jury subse-
quently convicted the defendant of burglary in the second degree.137 
Surprisingly, the Second Department, on appeal, reversed the 
defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial.138  The Second De-
partment held that the DNA profile match was testimonial in nature 
 
second degree murder, two counts of first degree assault, and he was sentenced to twenty 
years to life for the murder which would run consecutively with three twenty year prison 
terms for the other charges). 
130 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 450. 
131 Id. 
132 Compare id. (holding that the DNA evidence could be admitted as a business record, 
and did not implicate the Confrontation Clause, so there was no requirement for live in-court 
testimony), with Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (holding that the DNA evidence was testimo-
nial, and was inadmissible absent live in-court testimony from the actual person who per-
formed the test; a substitute witness would be insufficient to withstand a Confrontation 
Clause violation). 
133 938 N.Y.S.2d 619 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012).  Compare id. at 621 (holding that the 
DNA reports, matching the defendant’s blood with the blood at the crime scene, which were 
prepared by the Suffolk County Crime Laboratory, were testimonial), with Umpierre, 951 
N.Y.S.2d at 385 (holding that the Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 results, showing that the 
defendant’s blood-alcohol level was above the legal limit, which were conducted by NYPD 
Officer Stephen Rizzo, were testimonial).  The Second Department decided Oliver seven 
months before the Fourth Department decided Umpierre.  Id. 
134 Oliver, 938 N.Y.S.2d 619. 
135 Id. at 621. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
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because it did not consist of “machine-generated graphs” and “raw 
data,” as enunciated in Brown, but instead “consisted of information 
which shed light on the guilt of the defendant and accused the de-
fendant ‘by directly linking him . . . to the crime.’ ”139  The Second 
Department rejected the analysis in Brown, reasoning that the admis-
sion of this evidence violated Crawford and the Confrontation Clause 
because the source of this information did not testify at trial and was 
not subject to cross-examination.140  Moreover, the court rejected the 
prosecution’s contention that this evidence was properly admitted to 
“complete the narrative.”141  The court emphasized that the trial 
court’s error in admitting this evidence could not be deemed harmless 
because it would compromise the defendant’s constitutional right to 
confront his accusers.142 
However, the New York Court of Appeals recently decided 
People v. Pealer, holding that Breathalyzer calibration reports, of-
fered to show the reliability of the Breathalyzer instrument, were 
non-testimonial.143  In Pealer, police officers pulled over the defend-
ant after observing him weaving in-and-out of lanes.144  Upon speak-
ing with the defendant, the officers noticed that his eyes were red and 
glassy and that his speech was slurred.145  After the defendant was ar-
rested for failing the field sobriety tests and an initial breath screen-
ing, he took another Breathalyzer at the station, which revealed that 
his blood-alcohol content was twice the legal limit.146 
At trial, the prosecution offered two documents which stated 
that the Breathalyzer instrument had been calibrated by the New 
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services in Albany and a 
third document which stated that the simulator solution sample was 
approved for use in the Breathalyzer by the State Police.147  Despite 
the defendant’s objection that his inability to cross-examine the au-
thor of each report violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, 
the court admitted the reports as a business record and the jury con-
 
139 Oliver, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22. 
140 Id. at 622. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 985 N.E.2d at 904. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 904-05. 
146 Id. at 905. 
147 Id. (noting that these documents were introduced to show that the Breathalyzer at issue 
was in proper working order at the time it was given to the defendant). 
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victed the defendant.148  On appeal, the Fourth Department affirmed, 
stating that the calibration reports were non-testimonial because they 
were not accusatory, nor did they link the defendant to the charged 
crime because they simply established the working order of the 
Breathalyzer.149 
On review, the New York Court of Appeals utilized its prima-
ry purpose test and acknowledged that “the records at issue bear 
some resemblance to traditional testimonial hearsay because they 
contain certified declarations of fact attesting that the breathalyzer 
machine was functioning properly and its readings were accurate and 
reliable.”150  However, this consideration alone, the court stated, 
could not outweigh the remaining considerations.151  With regard to 
classifying documents, the court relied on dicta from Melendez-Diaz, 
observing that “[the Supreme Court] recognized the possibility that 
records ‘prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance’—
precursors to an actual Breathalyzer test of a suspect—’may well 
qualify as non-testimonial records.’ ”152  However, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the suggestion that “Melendez-Diaz pronounced a shift 
in Confrontation Clause analysis that might call our precedent into 
question.”153 
V. RECONCILING THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF 
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, regarding the 
Constitution and federal law, are binding precedent on the lower 
courts; however, the New York Court of Appeals has declined to fol-
low the Supreme Court’s reasoning and has created conflict and in-
consistencies among lower courts.154 
Although the Court in Crawford declined to name what spe-
 
148 Pealer, 985 N.E.2d at 905. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 906-07. 
151 Id. at 907. 
152 Id. 
153 Pealer, 985 N.E.2d at 907. 
154 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 691 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
“[t]here is no room in our system for departing from this principle [that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions are binding], for if it were otherwise, the law of the land would quickly lose its co-
herence.”); People v. Kin Kan, 574 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that all courts 
are bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution 
and federal statutes). 
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cific and particular types of evidence are testimonial, the Court estab-
lished three categories in order to aid courts in making this determi-
nation.155  In Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the Supreme Court 
gave additional insight as to what evidence resembles “ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent,” what considerations are 
important in making this determination, and under what circumstanc-
es this type of evidence is admissible without violating the Confron-
tation Clause.156  The Court established, in Melendez-Diaz, that the 
affidavit, which revealed that the defendant possessed cocaine at the 
time of his arrest, was testimonial, regardless of the fact that a neutral 
laboratory conducted the testing.157  The Court’s decision in 
Bullcoming bolstered the protection of the Confrontation Clause by 
making it clear that the testimonial evidence could only be admissible 
when the person who physically conducted the tests or certified the 
documents could be cross-examined in court.158  By deeming the fo-
rensic laboratory affidavits at issue in Melendez-Diaz and the blood-
alcohol test reports at issue in Bullcoming testimonial,159 the Supreme 
Court added to the principles established in Crawford.160 
When the New York Court of Appeals analyzed Rawlins, only 
Crawford had been decided, which did not include any discussion 
about scientific testing.161  Yet, the Court of Appeals, recognized that 
latent fingerprint comparison reports under Crawford standards, in 
which police officers identified a match between the defendant’s fin-
gerprints and the fingerprints found at the crime scene, were “nothing 
but testimonial.”162  However, even after Melendez-Diaz, the New 
York Court of Appeals in Brown relied on its decision in Meekins, in 
which the court held that rape-kit DNA reports were non-
testimonial.163  The court dismissed the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
 
155 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (noting that determination of constitutional admissibility 
is almost always fact-specific as the inquiry is whether an out-of-court statement is a proper 
substitute for accusatory in-court testimony). 
156 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310; Bullcoming, 131 S Ct. 2705. 
157 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 306 (holding that the affidavit was testimonial because the 
results either inculpated or exculpated the defendant, and an objective witness conducting 
the tests would reasonably know that this type of report would be used in a criminal prosecu-
tion). 
158 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2705. 
159 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 306; Bullcoming, 131 S Ct. at 2705. 
160 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
161 Id. 
162 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033. 
163 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932. 
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and placed great weight on the fact that a neutral party conducted the 
DNA testing, which only revealed non-identifying “raw data.”164  
However, the Court of Appeals failed to realize that the DNA data 
report, which is a certified affidavit under both Crawford and Melen-
dez-Diaz, supplies the reader with scientific test results, which shed 
light on the defendant’s guilt.165  The OCME analyst who testified in 
Brown had no personal knowledge of the tests that were performed 
on both samples and could not testify to any errors that occurred dur-
ing that process.166  The fact that she came to her own conclusion 
about the defendant’s guilt should not dispose of the safeguards of 
the Confrontation Clause in allowing the DNA reports into evidence.  
The New York Court of Appeals’ interpretation of DNA evidence as 
non-testimonial is inconsistent with the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.167 
Despite being decided before Bullcoming, both of the reports 
in Thompson and Encarnacion should have been deemed testimonial 
under the first and third categories set forth in Crawford.168  The job 
of both the private lab technician in Thompson and the OCME ana-
lyst in Encarnacion was predicated on obtaining results which will be 
used in aid of an investigation, which in many cases leads to a trial.169  
The courts in Thompson and Encarnacion also rejected the Court’s 
reasoning in Melendez-Diaz, which stressed the importance of being 
able to use confrontation as a tool of reliability to protect against 
fraudulent or incompetent forensic evidence.170  By determining that 
the reports were non-testimonial and admitting them into evidence 
without live in-court testimony, the courts in Thompson and 
Encarnacion violated the very essence of what the Court in Melen-
dez-Diaz and Bullcoming sought to protect—the reliability of the evi-
dence and the defendant’s ability to confront the actual person who 
 
164 Id. at 930-31. 
165 Id. at 932. 
166 Id. at 930. 
167 Id. at 928. 
168 Thompson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 149; Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 446.  The first catego-
ry is an affidavit that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, and the third category in-
cludes statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to believe 
those statements would be used at trial.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
169 Thompson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 149. 
170 Id.; Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (rejecting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 312, 
319). 
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performed the tests that shed light on his or her guilt.171 
In DWI prosecutions specifically, New York courts should 
follow the trend set in Oliver and Umpierre because the very nature 
of sobriety tests, prepared by law enforcement and not a neutral 
agency, are to prove that the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was ei-
ther above or below the legal limit, which will either convict or ac-
quit the defendant.172  The only reason the court in Rawlins did not 
find a Confrontation Clause violation was because there was already 
such overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.173  The court in 
Brown disregarded the Supreme Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz, 
that scientific testing affidavits qualified as testimonial, by relying on 
the court’s holding in Meekins that rape-kit DNA reports were non-
testimonial.174  This not only created confusion on what qualifies as 
testimonial evidence, but confusion on what precedent to follow.175 
VI. UMPIRING UMPIERRE 
The issue before the court in Umpierre was whether the 
Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 results were testimonial, and if so, 
whether Officer Glatz could testify on behalf of Officer Rizzo.176  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, the court correctly determined that the Breathalyzer and 
Intoxilyzer 5000 results were testimonial and that Officer Glatz could 
not testify on behalf of Officer Rizzo.  Assuming that the Fourth De-
partment dismissed the federal precedent, like its counterparts that 
followed the state precedent, it is likely that the Fourth Department 
would still have held Breathalyzers to be testimonial requiring testi-
mony from Officer Rizzo—exemplifying the importance of this deci-
sion for New York Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
 
171 Compare Thompson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 149 and Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 446, with 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 312, 319, and Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2705.  It is the author’s 
opinion that Thompson and Encarnacion should be overruled because those interpretations 
of what constitutes testimonial evidence and substitute witnesses are inconsistent with the 
precedent set forth by the United States Supreme Court. 
172 Compare Oliver, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22, with Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 383. 
173 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1026. 
174 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 930-31. 
175 Id. 
176 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 383. 
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A. Breathalyzers as Testimonial Evidence 
In a DWI prosecution, the admission of Breathalyzers as evi-
dence is two-fold: (1) the evidence of the actual test results regarding 
the blood-alcohol level, and (2) the certificates that confirm the 
Breathalyzer’s function, calibration, and maintenance.177  Regardless 
of whether the New York Court of Appeals in Pealer was correct in 
holding that documents certifying the function of the equipment are 
non-testimonial, and thus, admissible, it is evident that Crawford, 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, and even Brown, identify Breatha-
lyzers as testimonial.178  Breathalyzer results, which are often con-
ducted and prepared by law enforcement officials, will either incul-
pate or exculpate the defendant by showing that his blood-alcohol 
level was either above or below the legal limit.179  In Umpierre, the 
prosecution only sought to introduce the first type of Breathalyzer ev-
idence because the prosecution suggested that the Breathalyzer and 
Intoxilyzer 5000 were self-calibrating.180  If, under Pealer, the prose-
cution is allowed to submit the calibration certificates without impli-
cating the Confrontation Clause and is also allowed to submit the ac-
tual Breathalyzer results without necessitating live in-court 
testimony, the defendant would have no way to defend himself be-
cause he would not be able to cross-examine the documents.181  This 
would result in a conviction virtually every time.182 
B. Substitute Witnesses and Law Enforcement 
Involvement 
After determining that the test results were testimonial, re-
quiring live in-court testimony, the court in Umpierre considered 
whether Officer Glatz could testify in place of Officer Rizzo to with-
stand a constitutional violation. 
The court distinguished Umpierre from Brown because rather 
 
177 Carriera, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 846. 
178 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 386; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 (noting that if a 
Breathalyzer had been given to help the defendant receive medical attention or to solve an 
ongoing emergency, the results would likely have been deemed non-testimonial under Craw-
ford and Melendez-Diaz but still not under Bullcoming); Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 930. 
179 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 386. 
180 Id. at 384. 
181 Id. at 385. 
182 Id. 
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than a subcontractor of the OCME, law enforcement officials pre-
pared the Breathalyzer tests.183  The court in Umpierre observed that 
the New York Court of Appeals relied heavily on the fact that the 
scientific report in Brown arose from a source independent from law 
enforcement.184  In Umpierre, the court stated, “everything presented 
shows substantial law enforcement involvement,” and thus, “by ne-
cessity invokes a confrontational situation even under the Brown ra-
tionale.”185  While in Brown, the identity of the suspect was unknown 
and the testing did not connect the defendant to the crime until years 
later, Umpierre’s identity and guilt were known immediately follow-
ing the testing.186  This is more testimonial in nature than a forensic 
analyst’s test on a DNA sample to determine the identity of the per-
petrator because there is a greater risk that law enforcement officials 
will conduct procedures with a bias or motive to gain incriminating 
evidence. 
After determining that the Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 
results were testimonial, the Court properly concluded that Officer 
Glatz could not testify on Officer Rizzo’s behalf.  The Court in 
Bullcoming made it clear that the only way to prevent a Confronta-
tion Clause violation is to have the person who conducted the tests 
testify.187  Officer Glatz, although a trained officer who knew of Of-
ficer Rizzo’s training with respect to Breathalyzers, did not have per-
sonal knowledge of the encounter, and he would not be able to an-
swer questions about the Breathalyzer equipment and test, including 
any possible human error.188 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause ju-
risprudence has evolved over time.189  The Court has effectuated a 
shift in determining whether there is a violation of a defendant’s right 
to confrontation, focusing more on the testimonial nature of the evi-
dence, rather than its reliability.190  While the Supreme Court has ex-
 
183 Id. at 386. 
184 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 386. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714. 
188 Id. at 2714-15. 
189 Weisgerber, supra note 25, at 614. 
190 Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d at 4. 
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panded the meaning of testimonial, the New York Court of Appeals’ 
failure to follow the Supreme Court’s reasoning has caused confusion 
among its lower courts.191 
Despite this, the court’s decision in Umpierre follows the 
precedent set forth by the Supreme Court in Crawford, Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming.192  Even if the court in Umpierre used the test 
annunciated in Brown, it still would have determined that both the 
Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer results were testimonial, requiring in-
court testimony from Officer Rizzo because the prosecution’s case 
relied solely on the NYPD’s Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 test 
results, which revealed the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was 
above the legal limit.193  Because the test results’ sole purpose was to 
connect the defendant to the crime, in order to withstand a constitu-
tional violation, the live in-court testimony of the enforcement offi-
cial who conducted the tests, Officer Rizzo, was required.194 
Although the courts in New York, even after Crawford, 
Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming have narrowly interpreted what con-
stitutes testimonial evidence, it is evident that Breathalyzer results 
are, by their very nature, testimonial.  Therefore, the court in 
Umpierre correctly reasoned and concluded that the admission of the 
test results violated the Confrontation Clause.  The decision in 
Umpierre is very significant for New York Confrontation Clause ju-
risprudence because it will, like the seminal trio of federal cases, ef-
fectuate a shift within the lower courts, as the court properly observed 
that the involvement of law enforcement in collecting and presenting 
evidence lends itself to a court’s finding that the evidence is testimo-
nial in nature. 
 
191 Compare Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843 (holding that an autopsy report could be admitted 
as a business record, not requiring live in-court testimony, because an autopsy report is non-
testimonial), with Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (holding that an unredacted autopsy report could be 
admitted into evidence without testimony from the person who prepared it because it was not 
testimonial). 
192 Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d 382. 
193 Id. at 386. 
194 Id. 
23
Tuorto: You Blew It
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
1198 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
Stephanie R. Tuorto* 
 
 
* Touro Law, J.D. Candidate (2014); Quinnipiac University B.A. in Political Science magna 
cum laude (2011).  I would like to thank my editors Danielle Hansen, Alex Berkman, An-
thony Fasano, and Tara Breslawski for their patience and guidance in the development of 
this case note.  To Professors Rena Seplowitz and Gary Shaw for their assistance and invalu-
able insight over the past three years.  To Professor Lynne Adair Kramer for molding me 
into a courtroom-ready trial lawyer.  To Assistant District Attorneys Peter Lomp, Shane 
Butland, and Anthony Russolello, for taking me under their wings and affirming my goal of 
becoming a criminal prosecutor.  To Attorneys Steven Stern, Joseph Fritz, and Jack Evans, 
for supporting me from the very beginning of my legal education.  To all of my teachers at 
Kings Park and Quinnipiac, who instilled within me an eagerness to learn, especially Donna 
Strunk, Jack Bishop, Sally Ayres, Kevin Johnston, Ned Burt, Jack Doyle, Colleen Driscoll, 
Ed D’Angelo, Dianna Vagianos, and Doris Tishkoff.  To the most incredible parents, mom 
and dad, thank you for always being there for me no matter what and for believing with such 
conviction that my hard work will always pay off.  To my three older brothers, Louis, Mi-
chael, and Andrew, for being my lion, my scarecrow, and my tinman, throughout my yellow-
brick journey of life.  To my nephew and nieces Louie, Gianna, Isabella, Adrianna, and Oliv-
ia, for motivating me to make this world a better place for you.  And to John for showing me 
true love and making all of this worthwhile.  Finally, I would like to dedicate my first publi-
cation to my grandparents and my guardian angel Rose Tuorto, who taught me that while I 
may not be able to do everything—I can do anything! 
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 4, Art. 17
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/17
